ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose three relay selection schemes for full-duplex heterogeneous networks in the presence of multiple cognitive radio eavesdroppers. In this setup, the cognitive small-cell nodes (secondary network) can share the spectrum licensed to the macro-cell system (primary network) on the condition that the quality-of-service of the primary network is always satisfied subjected to its outage probability constraint. The messages are delivered from one small-cell base station to the destination with the help of full-duplex small-cell base stations, which act as relay nodes. Based on the availability of the network's channel state information at the secondary information source, three different selection criteria for full-duplex relays, namely: 1) partial relay selection; 2) optimal relay selection; and 3) minimal self-interference relay selection, are proposed. We derive the exact closed-form and asymptotic expressions of the secrecy outage probability for the three criteria under the attack of non-colluding/colluding eavesdroppers. We demonstrate that the optimal relay selection scheme outperforms the partial relay selection and minimal self-interference relay selection schemes at the expense of acquiring full channel state information knowledge. In addition, increasing the number of the full-duplex small-cell base stations can improve the security performance. At the illegitimate side, deploying colluding eavesdroppers and increasing the number of eavesdroppers put the confidential information at a greater risk. Besides, the transmit power and the desire outage probability of the primary network have great influences on the secrecy outage probability of the secondary network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid increase in the number of wireless devices has brought about a tremendous growth in the demand for radio spectrum. In this situation, cognitive radio (CR) [1] , [2] has become a promising technology for efficient spectrum usage as the unlicensed secondary users (SUs) in a CR network are allowed to access the spectrum of the licensed primary users (PUs) without interfering the PUs. For the underlay CR, the SUs are permitted to transmit information over the licensed spectrum simultaneously with the PUs as long as the interference constraint at the PUs is not exceeded [3] . When the direct transmission between secondary transmitter and receiver is impossible due to their distance, relaying techniques can have great influences by establishing successful communication. However, the secondary network's performance can be restrained considerably by the primary network constraints. To overcome this challenge, in CR networks, relay selection protocols were introduced and have been proven to offer remarkable performance improvement [4] . By applying proper relay selection protocols, CR systems can achieve full diversity order. The cognitive relay selection schemes for amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) protocols were studied in the literature [4] , [5] .
Nevertheless, conventional half-duplex relays in the aforementioned studies suffer from spectral inefficiency due to their listening/transmiting sessions. Fortunately, full-duplex communication, which offers spectrum efficiency, has proved its feasibility in practice with the first full-duplex node prototypes being introduced [6] , [7] . The combination of full-duplex relay (FDR) and relay selection protocols in CR networks has attracted great attention [8] - [10] . Despite the significant advantages, allowing the spectrum sharing in CR network has its drawbacks, i.e., the coexistence of the licensed and unlicensed users in the same network makes the confidential messages vulnerable to security attacks.
Although the upper layer cryptographic methods are usually deployed to protect the networks against eavesdropping in conventional wireless communications, they are uneconomical and unreliable in shielding confidential transmission [11] . Physical layer security (PLS) was introduced to provide another level of protection in addition to the existing cryptographic protocols [12] , [13] . The main idea is that PLS adopts the characteristics of wireless channels to defense confidential messages against wiretapping [14] . With the feasibility of the full-duplex transmission, there have been some PLS studies in FDR [15] - [17] . In [18] , the authors studied a self-protection scheme with full-duplex capability at the multi-antenna receiver. In [19] , the authors investigated a full-duplex wiretap channel in which the full-duplex legitimate receiver can switch jamming/receiving function between its two antennas for enhancing security. In [20] , a joint information and jamming beamforming approach at the full-duplex base station, which can improve the secrecy performance, was studied. In [21] , two kinds of eavesdroppers were considered in various full-duplex based jamming strategies: 1) Naive eavesdropper that does not have the knowledge of the cooperative transmission at the relay wiretaps confidential messages from either the source or the relay; and 2) Informed eavesdropper that has the knowledge of legitimate transmission eavesdrops confidential messages from both the source and the relay. In [22] , the authors considered a self-protection scheme in a multi-hop relaying system where the relays operating in full-duplex mode simultaneously transmit jamming signal to the eavesdropper and receive messages from the previous node. In [23] , a beamforming scheme for a full-duplex base station to eradicate self-interference and protect the transmission was proposed. In [24] , the authors investigated a cooperative secrecy transmission scheme in a multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) wiretap channel, in which the legitimate fullduplex receiver uses part of its antennas to transmit jamming signals to degrade eavesdropping channel.
However, the CR approach has not been considered in all the previous works on PLS of FDR networks. Very recently, the security of a simple CR with FDR in the presence of a single primary receiver and a single eavesdropper with PRS has been investigated in [25] . To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time CR has been considered in the secure FDR networks in a general framework. Specifically, we investigate the effect of full-duplex DF relays on the secrecy performance of the cognitive relay networks with the appearance of multiple eavesdroppers and multiple primary receivers. The reason of selecting DF strategy is that it has better throughput in the presence of the self-interference as compared to AF strategy [26] .
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose three relay selection schemes based on the availability of the system's channel state information (CSI) at the secondary information source, i.e., optimal relay selection (ORS), partial relay selection (PRS), and minimal self-interference relay selection (MSRS), to enhance the secrecy performance of the full-duplex heterogeneous networks under the malicious attacks of non-colluding/colluding eavesdroppers (NCE/CE) at the illegitimate side. In the proposed network, the quality-of-service (QoS) of the primary network subjected to its outage probability is always satisfied.
• We develop the analytical expressions to investigate the performance of the three relay selection schemes in securing full-duplex cognitive relay systems. In particular, the exact closed-form and asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the considered system in the three relay selection schemes are derived.
• We have demonstrated that the ORS scheme surpasses PRS and MSRS schemes in terms of SOP. Besides, increasing the number of relays and loosening the QoS constraints of the primary network can strengthen the secrecy performance of the considered system. In addition, deploying colluding eavesdroppers and growing the number of eavesdroppers reduce the secrecy performance of the considered system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system and channel models are described in section II. The exact closed-form expressions of the system SOP in the three relay selection schemes with the NCE/CE strategies at the illegitimate side are presented in section III. In section IV, the asymptotic analyses of the system SOP are provided. The numerical results based on Monte-Carlo methods are presented in section V to confirm the correctness of our analyses. Finally, we conclude this paper in section VI.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
We consider a cognitive relay network consisting of a macrocell, which includes a single antenna macro base station (BS) P TX (primary transmitter), M single antenna mobile users P m (primary receivers) for m = {1, . . . , M }, a single antenna small-cell BS (secondary information source) S, K secondary full-duplex small-cell BSs (secondary relays) R k for k = {1, . . . , K }, a single antenna secondary receiver D, and N single antenna eavesdroppers E n as shown in Fig. 1 . In the system,
S → E n , and R k → E n links experience Rayleigh fading and are independent and identically distributed, in which the channel power gains are exponential distributed with parameters λ X for X = {P, SP, RP, SR, RD SE, RE}, respectively. The noise at P m , the legitimate secondary receivers, and E n are modeled as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variances N P , N 0 , and N E , respectively.
A. SECONDARY NETWORK TRANSMIT POWER CONSTRAINTS
In the primary network, P TX sends information to P m through the channel h P m for m = {1, . . . , M }, with the transmit power P P . In addition, during the transmission of the secondary network, P m is interfered by signals transmitted from a chosen relay R k * , which is selected in the relay selection process to help S transfer information to D, and S through the interference channels, i.e., h SP m and h R k * P m .
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at P m is given as
where P S and P R are the transmit power of S and R k * , respectively. To protect the primary network, the transmit powers of S and R k * have to satisfy the QoS of the primary network. In this work, the QoS of the primary network is characterized by its desired outage probability defined as follows [27] :
where β P th = 2 R P th − 1, R P th is the target min-rate of the primary network, and 0 < κ < 1 is the desired outage probability of the primary network. From (2), we choose nonoptimal conditions for P S and P R as follows:
where ε = κ 2 . From (3), P S can be derived as
where
Similarly, from (4), P R can be derived as
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
B. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In the secondary network, there are two hops of legitimate transmission, i.e., S → R k and R k → D. We also assume that there is no direct transmission path form S → D due to the long distance. In the first hop, S transmits signal to R k through channel h SR k . To enable full-duplex mode, R k is equipped with two antennas (one receive antenna and one transmit antenna) and suffers from self-interference of fullduplex mode. The self-interference channel h R k of R k that cannot be completely suppressed by the self-interference cancellation techniques is modeled as an independent Rayleigh distributed channel [28] . As a result, |h R k | 2 is exponential distributed with parameter λ R . The instantaneous SINR at R k is given as
. We obtain (8) under the condition that ξ > 0 because if ξ ≤ 0, the transmit power of S and R k is zero, followed by zero achievable secrecy rate. Meanwhile, in the second hop, D receives information from R k through channel h R k D with the assumption that there is no direct link from S to D. The signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at D is given as
At the illegitimate side, E n tries to eavesdrop information from both S → R k and R k → D links with the assumption that E n can separate the messages from the S and R k thanks to its knowledge of S and R k transmissions [21] . The instantaneous SNR at E n in the first hop and the second hop are given as
where h SE n * and h R k E n * are the channel coefficients of links S → E n * and R k → E n * , respectively, γ E = P P N E , and n * indicates the selected eavesdropper(s) in NCE/CE schemes at the illegitimate side.
In the considered network, R k implements DF technique and uses the different code book to S to enhance the secrecy VOLUME 4, 2016 performance as in [29] . Therefore, the secrecy capacity of transmission path S → R k → D is given as
are the achievable secrecy rate of the first hop and the second hop, respectively, and [x] + = max(x, 0). Based on the availability of network's CSI at S, three relay selection schemes, i.e., PRS, ORS, and MSRS, are applied to select the helping relay R k * to aid S transfer information to D. As a result, the secrecy capacity of the proposed system given in (12) can be rewritten as
where eq = min( 1k * , 2k * ). The secrecy outage probability of the considered system is given as
where R th is the target rate of the secondary network and β = 2 R th .
C. COOPERATIVE SCHEMES AT LEGITIMATE SIDE
Relay selection schemes are considered to improve secrecy performance of the proposed system. In this work, we deploy three relay selection strategies, namely PRS, ORS, and MSRS.
1) PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION (PRS)
In some networks such as wireless sensor networks, relay selection can not be utilized based on the CSI of all links in the network due to energy constraints. Therefore, the PRS scheme selects the aiding relay based on the CSI of the first hop's links. The aiding relay R p is chosen as follows:
2) OPTIMAL RELAY SELECITON (ORS)
In the ORS scheme, S has full knowledge of the system's CSI 1 to choose the helping relay that can maximize the secrecy capacity of the considered system. R o is selected as follows:
1 The CSI of eavesdropping channels can be obtained when the eavesdropper is an active node in networks. However, it is challenging to attain the CSI for the passive eavesdropping scenario.
3) MINIMAL SELF-INTERFERENCE RELAY SELECTION (MSRS)
In the MSRS scheme, the chosen relay R s is selected based on the self-interference channels of relays to guarantee the minimal interference at the aiding relay's receive antenna. R s is chosen as follows:
III. EXACT SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, the exact closed-form expressions of the SOP in the PRS, ORS and MSRS schemes in the presence of NCE/CE are derived. Because the achievable secrecy rate depends on the eavesdroppers' capability to extract information from the wiretapped signals [30] , two schemes at the illegitimate side, i.e., NCE and CE, are taken into account.
In the former scheme, the eavesdroppers are unable to share the information with each other and the secure performance is determined by the most detrimental eavesdropper, i.e., the best SNR from the eavesdropping viewpoint. Meanwhile, in the latter scheme, the eavesdroppers can exchange and combine the received information to decode the message.
In the NCE case, the secrecy performance is solely determined by the most detrimental eavesdroppers who have the best links to the legitimate users of the first and the second hop. These eavesdroppers are respectively denoted as
For the sake of simplifying the notation, we denote b as the selected eavesdroppers of the both hops. The SNR at the illegitimate side in the first hop and the second hop are respectively formulated as
In the CE scheme, the eavesdroppers can combine signals from all the illegitimate links to decode the message of the legitimate side. Therefore, the SNR at the illegitimate side in the first hop and the second hop are respectively given as
A
. PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION
The secrecy capacity of the proposed system in the PRS scheme is given as
where PRS = min( 1p , 2p ).
From (8) and (17), the SINR at R p is given as
1) NCE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE From (27) and (22),
is formulated as
From (9) and (23),
is derived as
From (26), (28), and (29), NCE PRS can be written as follows:
From (30), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
The SOP of the considered system in the PRS scheme with NCE at the illegitimate side is given as follows:
where Ei(·), as defined in [31, eq. (8.221.1)], is the exponential integral function and
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
2) CE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE From (27) and (24), CE 1p is expressed as
From (9) and (25), CE 2p is calculated as
From (26), (33), and (34), CE PRS can be written as follows:
From (35), we have the following lemma. Lemma 2: The SOP of the considered system in the PRS scheme with CE at the illegitimate side is formulated as follows:
where (·) is the upper incomplete gamma function. Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
B. OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION
The secrecy capacity of the proposed system in the ORS scheme is derived as
where ORS = max k=1,...,K min( 1k , 2k ).
1) NCE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE
From (8), (9), (13), (14), (22), (23), and (37), NCE ORS is derived as follows:
From (38) we have the following lemma. Lemma 3: The SOP of the considered system in the ORS scheme with NCE at the illegitimate side is given as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
2) CE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE From (8), (9), (13), (14) , (24) , (25) , and (37),
CE
ORS is derived as follows:
From (40) we have the following lemma. Lemma 4: The SOP of the considered system in the ORS scheme with CE at the illegitimate side is expressed as follows:
where U(·, ·, ·), as defined in [31, eq. (9.220.1)], is the confluent hypergeometric function.
Proof:
The proof is given in Appendix E.
C. MINIMAL SELF-INTERFERENCE RELAY SELECTION
The secrecy capacity of the proposed system in the MSRS scheme is given as
where MSRS = min( 1s , 2s ). The SINR at R s is given as
1) NCE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE
From (9), (22), (23) can be formulated as follows:
NCE 2s
From (42), (44), and (45), NCE MSRS can be derived as
From (46) we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5:
The SOP of the considered system in the MSRS scheme with NCE at the illegitimate side is given as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix F.
2) CE SCHEME AT THE ILLEGITIMATE SIDE
From (9), (24), (25) , and (43), CE 1s and CE 2s can be written as follows:
From (42), (49), and (50), CE MSRS can be derived as
From (51) we have the following lemma. Lemma 6: The SOP of the considered system in the MSRS scheme with CE at the illegitimate side is expressed as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix G.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSES
In this section, the asymptotic analyses of the SOP are formulated to have further insight into the system performance, e.g., secrecy diversity gain. We can observe that the considered system has zero diversity order due to the self-interference inflicted by the full-duplex mechanism.
A. PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION
The asymptotic SOP of the considered system in the PRS scheme with the NCE/CE schemes at the illegitimate side can be derived respectively as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix H.
B. OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION
The asymptotic SOP of the ORS scheme with the NCE/CE schemes at the illegitimate side can be given respectively as follows:
C. MINIMAL SELF-INTERFERENCE RELAY SELECTION
The asymptotic SOP of the considered system in the MSRS scheme with the NCE/CE schemes at the illegitimate side can be formulated respectively as follows:
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the simulation results based on Monte Carlo method are provided to verify the accuracy of the above performance analyses. In the two-dimensional topology, we assume the co-ordinates of S, P, P TX , R, D, and E are (0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 0), (3, 0) , and (1, −1). The distance between the nodes is calculated as
where A has the co-ordinate (x A , y A ) and B has the coordinate (x B , y B ). To take path-loss into account, we assume
where pl is the path-loss exponent and λ X = {λ P , λ SP , λ SR , λ SE , λ RP , λ RD , λ RE }. In this simulation, pl = 3, the target rate of the primary network is set R P th = 0.4 bits/s/Hz, λ R = 20, and the target rate of the secondary network is set R th = 0.2 bits/s/Hz. VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 2. SOP of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes with different numbers of relays when NCE scheme is at the illegitimate side. FIGURE 3. SOP of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes with different numbers of relays when CE scheme is at the illegitimate side.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , the SOP of the considered system has been evaluated as a function of γ M when M = 2, N = 4, γ E = 20 dB, and κ = 0.06. The number of relays is varied to examine its effect on the system's SOP. As increasing K , the SOP in all the schemes decreases. However, the variation in K has the biggest impact on the performance of the ORS strategy. Meanwhile, the smallest impact is witnessed in the MSRS scheme. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the SOP of the considered system with the variation in the number of eavesdroppers. The number of relays and primary receivers are K = 5, M = 2, γ E is fixed at 20 dB, and the desired outage probability of the primary network is κ = 0.06. Generally, the higher the value of N is, the greater dangerous the considered system takes. However, the value of N has a stronger influence on the secrecy performance of the considered system in the CE scheme than in the NCE scheme. In particular, the SOP of the considered system in the NCE scheme remains almost unchanged with the variation of the number of eavesdroppers. In the CE scheme, the biggest effect of changing the number of eavesdroppers is seen in the ORS case while the smallest effect is observed in the MSRS case.
The effect of the number of primary receivers on the SOP of the considered system is demonstrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 with K = 4, N = 3, κ = 0.06, and γ E = 20 dB. As increasing the number of the primary receivers, the QoS of the primary network is tighten. Thus, to enable the secondary network, the primary network has to raise the transmit power. This observation can also be witnessed from (6) by reformulating the condition ξ > 0 subjected to γ P as follows:
However, increasing the number of the primary receivers and the transmit power of the primary network allow the secondary transmitters to have higher transmit power, which result in a reduction in the SOP.
In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , SOP is plotted as a function of the desired outage probability of the primary network ε to 3094 VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 6. SOP of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes with different numbers of primary receivers when NCE scheme is at the illegitimate side. FIGURE 7. SOP of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes with different numbers of primary receivers when CE scheme is at the illegitimate side.
demonstrate the influence of QoS of the primary network on the SOP of the secondary network with M = 2, N = 2, K = 3, γ M = 30 dB, and γ E = 10 dB. As relaxing the QoS requirement of the primary network, the secondary transmitters can increase their transmit power to have a better secrecy performance. However, if the desired outage probability of the primary network is over-relaxed, the transmit power of the full-duplex small-cell stations will be high, followed by a high self-interference transmission in the first hop of the secondary network which can significantly suppress the security performance.
From Fig. 2 to Fig. 7 , we also witness the effect of the primary transmitter's transmit power on the SOP of the secondary full-duplex network. On the one hand, if the transmit power of the primary transmitter is too small, the secondary network will be disable or the transmit power of the secondary network will be insufficient for a good secrecy performance. On the other hand, if the transmit power of the primary transmitter is powerful, it will result in a high self-interference transmission in the first hop of the secondary network. As a FIGURE 8. SOP versus ε of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes when NCE scheme is at the illegitimate side. FIGURE 9. SOP versus ε of the considered system for the three relay selection schemes when CE scheme is at the illegitimate side.
result, the SOP of the first hop dominates the SOP of the considered system in the high SNR regime.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the secure performance of the heterogeneous networks with multiple decode-and-forward fullduplex small-cell base stations, multiple eavesdroppers, and multiple primary users over Rayleigh fading channel has been studied. In particular, three relay selection schemes, i.e., partial relay selection, optimal relay selection, and minimal self-interference relay selection, have been proposed to enhance the security performance. In addition, two schemes at the illegitimate side, namely non-colluding eavesdroppers and colluding eavesdroppers, have been taken into account. For the proposed system, the closed-form and the asymptotic analyses of the secrecy outage probability in the three relay selection schemes have been derived. The results have shown that the legitimate side should increase the number of relays and adopt the ORS scheme for better security. Meanwhile, at the illegitimate side, deploying the CE and increasing the number of eavesdroppers will put the security of the considered system in a greater danger. In addition, the transmit VOLUME 4, 2016 power and the desired outage probability of the primary network have great impacts on the secrecy outage probability of the secondary network and should be carefully designed. Finally, the numerical results have been provided to validate our correctness.
APPENDIX A TRANSMIT POWER OF SOURCE AND RELAYS SUBJECTED TO PRIMARY NETWORK'S OUTAGE PROBABILITY
We denote that
and 1P = min 
From (3) and (A.2), the maximum transmit power of S is given as follows:
Similarly, the maximum transmit power of R is given as in (7).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (26) is given as
From (27) , the CDF of R p is given as
can be derived as follows: is given as
From (26) can be derived as follows: 
The CDF of NCE ORS can be derived as follows:
To find NCE 1k , we find the CDF of R k first. From (8), the CDF of R k can be derived as follows:
The CDF of
conditioned on Y can be calculated as
The CDF of 
(E.1)
We denote Z = |h SE c | 2 . The PDF of Z is given as
The CDF of CE ORS can be derived as follows:
APPENDIX F PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The CDF of R s is derived as is given as follows: From (F.1), the CDF of CE 1s is given as follows: 
APPENDIX H PROOF OF ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In the high SRN regime, R k * is given as
Therefore, from (15) , eq in the high SINR regime is derived as
From (H.2), following similar steps as in Appendix VIAppendix VI, we have the asymptotic SOP of the considered system in all the schemes.
